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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
BRONX COUNTY
People v. Garcia-Cepero'
(decided October 23, 2008)
Javier Garcia-Cepero was charged with operating a motor ve-
hicle under the influence of alcohol, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic
Law ("VTL") section 1192.2 At his Mapp hearing, 3 Garcia-Cepero
claimed that the New York City Police Department's procedure in
administering a breathalyzer test and executing the provisions set
forth in VTL section 1194(2)(f) to a non-English speaking motorist,
violated his equal protection and due process rights guaranteed under
the United States Constitution4 and New York Constitution5 by fail-
ing to provide an interpreter at the time of the breathalyzer request.6
The Bronx County Supreme Court determined that the officers had
probable cause to stop and arrest the defendant,7 but the defendant's
expressions and body language did not indicate a refusal to submit to
a breathalyzer test. Accordingly, the court held that the Police De-
partment's procedure for administering a breathalyzer test and ex-
ecuting the provisions set forth in VTL section 1194 violated Garcia-
' 874 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2008).
2 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 691. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(1) (McKinney
2006), states that "[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to op-
erate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol." N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney 2006), states that "[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle
while in an intoxicated condition."
A Mapp hearing is held to determine whether evidence, implicating a defendant, was
obtained by a search and seizure in violation of the United States Constitution and thus,
ought to be suppressed. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in pertinent part: "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof."
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Cepero's equal protection and procedural due process rights.'
In November 2006, Javier Garcia-Cepero, a non-English
speaking motorist, was observed driving on the wrong side of the
road by two police officers. 9 As the officers followed Garcia-Cepero,
it took them multiple attempts to successfully pull him over.'o After
Garcia-Cepero complied with the officers' request to step out of the
vehicle, the officers noticed a "strong alcohol odor emanating from
the motorist's body," as well as other physical signs that he was
heavily intoxicated." As he exited the vehicle, Garcia-Cepero stated
"un pequetas."l 2 He was placed in custody and transported by the of-
ficers to the Forty-Fifth Precinct for a breathalyzer test.13
At the precinct, Garcia-Cepero was shown a video that pro-
vided a "verbatim Spanish interpretation" 4 of VTL section 1194.15
When asked whether or not he "consented or refused to take the brea-
thaly[z]er test," Garcia-Cepero stated "no drogas, no drogas," which
translates to "no drugs, no drugs" in English.16 The defendant was
not provided with a Spanish interpreter.' 7  Resultantly, the officers
interpreted his response in Spanish as a refusal."
After conducting a Mapp hearing, the Bronx County Supreme
Court determined that: 1) the officers had probable cause to stop and
arrest the defendant; 2) the defendant's statements in Spanish, facial
expressions, and body language did not indicate a refusal to submit to
a breathalyzer test; 3) the New York City Police Department's proce-
dure of affording both breath and physical tests to English speaking
defendants, but not non-English speaking defendants, violated equal
8 Id. at 698.
9 Id. at 691.
10 Id.
" Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 691-92.
12 The court had determined the phrase "un pequetas" did not have any Spanish transla-
tion. Id. at 691-92, 691 n.1.
13 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
14 id.
15 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § I l94(2)(f) (McKinney 2006), states, in pertinent part: "Evi-
dence of a refusal to submit to such chemical test or any portion thereof shall be admissible
in any trial, proceeding or hearing based ... upon a showing that the person was given suffi-
cient warning, in clear and unequivocal language, of the effect of such refusal and that the
person persisted in the refusal." (emphasis added).
16 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
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protection guarantees; 4) the New York City Police Department's
procedure of conducting roadside sobriety tests to English speaking
defendants, but not non-English speaking defendants, violated equal
protection guarantees, and 5) playing only the Spanish translated vid-
eo warning of the effect of the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol
test, without providing an interpreter violated the defendant's due
process rights.19
In its decision, the court relied heavily on the fact that VTL
section 1194 "does not differentiate between an English or non-
English speaking individual."20 The court explained that even though
"a statute may be nondiscriminatory on its face, it may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation." 2' Although the question was asked
in Garcia-Cepero's native language, the officers made no effort in de-
termining whether or not he understood it.22 According to the court,
this mode of enforcement was a clear violation of Garcia-Cepero's
equal protection rights, guaranteed by both the United States Consti-
tution and New York Constitution, because he did not understand the
English language.23 The court further explained that the method used
by the New York City Police Department "creates a classification
predicated upon a person's ability to speak and understand the Eng-
lish language and therefore discriminates against non-English speak-
ing individuals." 24  The court believed that Garcia-Cepero did not
reach the minimum threshold of understanding that was necessary in
order for him to make an informed decision.25 "The mere presence of
an interpreter who could have explained more fully the request to
take a chemical/breathalyzer test and the ramifications for failure to
consent, would have obviated the discriminatory procedure."26
" Id. at 692, 698.
20 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1)(b) (McKinney 2006), states, in pertinent part:
"Every person operating a motor vehicle ... which is operated in violation of any of the pro-
visions of this chapter shall, at the request of a police officer, submit to a breath test to be
administered by the police." (emphasis added). Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
21 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (quoting People v. Kennedy, 491 N.Y.S.2d 968,
970 (1985)).
22 Id. at 695-96.
23 Id. at 695.
24 id.
25 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (citing People v. Niedzwiecki, 487 N.Y.S.2d 694,
696 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1985)).
26 Id. at 696.
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The court also reasoned that this injustice was further ad-
vanced because of the availability of other sobriety tests that prove to
be crucial pieces of evidence in a jury trial and such tests are not of-
fered to non-English speaking defendants. 27 English speaking defen-
dants are given alternate tests when they are thought to be intox-
icated, whereas non-English speaking defendants are never given the
option.28 The court classified this distinction as "predicated merely
on the ability of a defendant to speak and understand English . . .
[which] violates the Equal Protection Clause of the [United States]
Constitution and is discriminatory." 29
In its analysis of whether or not Garcia-Cepero's procedural
due process rights were violated, the court focused on the three-part
test set out by the United States Supreme Court:
[First,] the private interest that will be affected by the
official action, [second,] the risk of an erroneous de-
privation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards, and [finally,] the govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addition-
al or substitute procedural requirements would entail.30
With respect to the defendant's private interest, the court stated
that the action or inaction of the officers would obviously affect Gar-
cia-Cepero's guilt or innocence and subsequently his privilege of
having a driver's license. 3' Furthermore, the court claimed that in-
quiry into the second part of the test reveals that the action or inaction
of the officers has a "direct relationship to the defendant's freedom
and privilege to drive."32 If convicted based on the evidence gathered
without remedying the defendant's language barrier, Garcia-Cepero




30 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 696-97 (quoting Medina v. Califomia, 505 U.S. 437,
443 (1992)).
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his driver's license.33 Furthermore, the court claims that both the
prosecution and defense would have benefitted from the use of an in-
terpreter. 34 Lastly, the government has a general interest and respon-
sibility in safeguarding all citizens' rights to due process. 35 Due to
this interest, the court reasoned that the benefits of employing an in-
terpreter outweigh the financial and administrative burdens that
would be assumed.36
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
requires states to provide equal protection under the law to all people
within its jurisdiction.3 ' As established by the United States Supreme
Court, "a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discrimi-
natory in its operation."3 In addressing the issue, the Court deter-
mines whether there has been a violation of a defendant's equal pro-
tection rights by analyzing "whether the State has invidiously denied
one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class
of defendants."39
The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the evaluation
stating, in 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, that "[t]he question of equal
protection turns ultimately on the similarity or dissimilarity of rights
differentiated by a statute; and the reasonableness of classification
when different methods are used to affect different classes."4 0 In
Lindsay, the Court reversed the First Department's decision and de-
clared that the New York City Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because its classification scheme
had a rational basis.4 1 The statute allegedly discriminated against
owners of pre-1947 housing units, who were "subject to less favora-
ble regulations" than owners of post-1947 housing units.42 The Court
determined the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause of public policy reasons such as encouragement of future con-
33 id.
34 id
3 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
6 Id. at 698.
3 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
38 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 n.11 (1956).
3 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983).
40 261 N.E.2d 647, 653 (N.Y. 1970).
41 Id. at 654-55.
42 Id. at 653.
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struction and security of affordable housing. 43
In order to afford its motorists even greater protection than
what is required under federal law, New York has enforced an addi-
tional burden on the prosecution in cases involving non-English
speaking motorists to safeguard the defendant's guaranteed rights. In
People v. Niedzwiecki, the court impliedly 44 addressed the equal pro-
tection issues posed by VTL section 1194, by establishing what ex-
actly amounts to "clear and unequivocal language," as required by
statute. 45 The defendant in Niedzwiecki was a Polish immigrant,
pulled over by police for driving without headlights and in a weaving
pattern. 46 When he was asked to take a breathalyzer test, the defen-
dant specifically requested a Polish translator.47 The court decided
that "the warnings given to [the defendant] were not in clear and une-
quivocal language as mandated by . .. [VTL section] 1194" because
the Polish speaking personnel obtained to recite the relevant statute
did not sufficiently elevate the defendant to the "threshold point of
understanding the choice presented to him, so he m[ight] at least be
able to make a decision as to the course of conduct he w[ould]
take." 48
However, in People v. Rosario,49 the warnings administered
to the Spanish-speaking driver were held as sufficient to be consi-
dered "clear and unequivocal language."5 0 Defendant Rosario was
pulled over in his blue Chevrolet after a police officer observed him
remain at a newly turned green light for an "unusual" amount of
time.5 ' The defendant's eyes were bloodshot, he spoke in a slurred
manner, and his breath smelled of alcohol. 52 As a result, he was
placed under arrest and transported to the local precinct, where a vid-
eo advising him of his rights regarding the administration of breatha-
43 Id. at 653-54.
4 487 N.Y.S. 2d 694. The court never expressly mentioned that Niedzwiecki's equal pro-
tection rights were allegedly violated by the police officer's implementation of VTL section
1194. However, the court, in its analysis, impliedly addressed this constitutionality issue.
45 See Niedzwiecki, 487 N.Y.S.2d 694.
46 Id. at 695.
47 id
48 Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
49 518 N.Y.S.2d 906 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1987).
'o Id. at 912.
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lyzer tests was played for him in Spanish. The defendant responded
in the affirmative in Spanish when asked whether he was willing to
take the breathalyzer test.54 The court reasoned that the People met
"their burden of going forward to show that warnings were indeed
administered to defendant in Spanish, and that he gave every indica-
tion of appreciating the import of the message he viewed on the tape
and acquiesced readily in Officer Kowalski's invitation to submit to a
test."55
In People v. Reynolds, the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment directly addressed the same issue regarding VTL section
1194.56 The defendant in Reynolds had been observed crossing over
double center lines, swerving, and eventually colliding with another
vehicle.5 7 The defendant was given multiple warnings, in his intox-
icated state, by officers about his rights and each time refused to
submit to a breathalyzer test.5 8 One of the officers testified that on
more than one occasion during the night of the incident "he specifi-
cally advised defendant that his refusal to submit to a chemical test
would result in the immediate suspension and revocation of his li-
cense[,] regardless of whether he was found guilty of the charge for
which he was arrested." 59  The Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, affirmed the lower court's judgment in denying the defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence of his refusal to submit to the brea-
thalyzer test.60
Turning to the procedural due process issue, it is a well-
established principle that administrative procedures instituted and
performed by governmental agencies must comport with procedural
due process requirements, as determined by evaluating both the go-
vernmental and private interests affected. 6' The United States Su-
" Id. at 909.
$4 Rosario, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
5 Id. at 912. In furtherance of its reasoning, the court stated that "the onus [was] on the
People to establish voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
56 519 N.Y.S.2d 425, 428 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1987).
s Id. at 426.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 427-28.
6 Id. at 427.
61 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) ("[R]esolution of the issue [of]
whether the administrative procedures provided ... are constitutionally sufficient requires
analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected."); Arnett v. Kennedy,
2010] 1003
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preme Court has made it clear that " '[d]ue process,' unlike some le-
gal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances." 62 Rather, procedural due process
protections ought to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, depending
upon the particular circumstances. 63 Accordingly, the Court has es-
tablished three factors to consider in procedural due process claims.6
New York courts have been steadfast in their adoption of the
same standard while addressing procedural due process issues con-
cerning non-English speaking defendants. 65 The New York Court of
Appeals has recognized that "[d]ue process is a flexible constitutional
concept calling for such procedural protections as a particular situa-
tion may demand." 6 6 However, "[d]ue process is not ... a mechani-
cal formula or a rigid set of rules."67 Thus, procedural due process
challenges require "an evaluation of the interests of the parties to the
dispute, the adequacy of the contested procedures to protect those in-
terests and the government's stake in the outcome." 68 Accordingly,
the New York courts look to the three distinct factors that the United
States Supreme Court set forth in Mathews.69
416 U.S. 134, 167-68 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[R]esolution of this issue depends on
a balancing process in which the Government's interest [in the implementation of a certain
policy] . . . is weighed against the interest of the affected [private individual]."); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) ("The extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer
grievous loss,' and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss out-
weighs the governmental interest."); Cafeteria and Rest. Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-
CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ("[C]onsideration of what procedures due
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination
of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest
that has been affected by governmental action.").
62 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria and Rest. Workers Union, 367 U.S. at
895).
63 Id.
64 See supra text accompanying note 30.
65 See Yellen v. Baez, 676 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1997); People v. Torres, 772
N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2004).
66 LaRossa, Axenfeld & Mitchell v. Abrams, 468 N.E.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. 1984) (citing Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Harnett, 376 N.E.2d
1280, 1284 (N.Y. 1978)).
67 Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d 451, 457 (N.Y. 1968).
68 La Rossa, Axenfeld & Mitchell, 468 N.E.2d at 21 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35).
69 See supra text accompanying note 30; see also In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 486-87
(N.Y. 2004); County of Nassau v. Canavan, 802 N.E.2d 616, 623 (N.Y. 2003); La Rossa,
Axenfeld & Mitchell, 468 N.E.2d at 21.
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In Yellen v. Baez, suit was brought against the Spanish-
speaking defendants in pursuit of their delinquent rent payments and
eviction. 70 The Richmond County Civil Court had determined that
defendants, appearing pro se, needed the assistance of a Spanish in-
terpreter. 7 1 However, one was not readily available without an ad-
vanced request and the case was adjourned in order to secure an in-
terpreter.72 Although the defendants had qualified under the express
provisions of the relevant statute7 3 as having requested two adjourn-
ments, the court determined that "in spite of the statutory language,"
it would not charge the adjournment to the defendants because "[t]o
do so would violate both the equal protection and due process clauses
of the United States and New York State Constitutions."74 The court
reasoned that the Legislature's intent in drafting the statute was not to
charge an adjournment against a defendant who requires an interpre-
ter.7s Furthermore, charging the defendant with the adjournment
when the court is unable to obtain an interpreter and thereby trigger-
ing the rent deposit provisions of the statute would "make a mockery
of the due process protection afforded by the Constitution." 76
In People v. Torres, defendant pled guilty and was convicted
of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree.77
On appeal, Torres claimed that he had pled guilty to the offense be-
cause his "lack of proficiency in English prevented him from under-
standing what transpired during the plea proceeding."7 8 Torres had
declined the Schenectady County Court's offering of an interpreter
and responded to all questions asked of him in English. 79 Based on
the circumstances, the Appellate Division, Third Department found
no merit to Torres' argument that his "plea was not knowingly en-
70 Yellen, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
71 Id.
72 id
n See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2)(a) (McKinney 2007) (discussing that upon a
second request for an adjournment, a defendant may be required, by the court, to make a rent
deposit or payment, if the proceeding is not resolved within thirty days of the first court ap-
pearance).
74 Yellen, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
" Id. at 725.
76 Id. at 726.
n Torres, 772 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
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tered because of a lack of fluency in English" and thus defendant's
due process rights were not violated.o
In light of the equal protection and procedural due process
standards, the court's reasoning in Garcia-Cepero was improper. It
is indisputable that VTL section 1194 "does not differentiate between
. . . English or non-English speaking individuals."8  However, if a
distinction were to be made within VTL section 1194 between Eng-
lish and non-English speaking motorists, it would neither have the
same effect nor serve a similar public good as the distinction made in
the New York City Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 at issue in Lind-
say. Furthermore, although VTL section 1194's facially neutral sta-
tus does not preclude it from a constitutional challenge, a dispropor-
tionate impact on non-English speaking motorists alone does not
infer its unconstitutionality.82
There is no law in the United States that requires all persons
operating a vehicle to have the ability to speak and understand Eng-
lish. However, not surprisingly, with a primarily English speaking
population, there has been a push to declare English the official
language of the United States. 84 This is a clear indication of the na-
tionwide legitimate interest and strong public policy reasons for why
all persons operating a vehicle should have the ability to speak and
understand English. After all, road signs that must be followed by all
motorists are in English. Perhaps it can be criticized as an elitist
point of view, but when visiting, living, or working in a country that
employs a different language from one's own, one can absolutely ex-
pect-and it should not come as a surprise-that the laws are dictated
in such foreign language.
80 Id.
81 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
82 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("[O]ur cases have not embraced
the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional [s]oley because it has a racially disproportionate
impact.").
83 In 1990, it was reported that approximately only eighty-six percent of persons over the
age of five in the United States spoke only English. See U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/pop ulation/socdemo/language/table5.txt (last visited January 17,
2010).
8 See Sen. Inhofe Introduces English Language Unity Act, U.S. FED. NEWS, May 16,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 9347747 (discussing the English Language Unity Act of
2009 that was recently introduced in the Senate to "declare English as the official language
of the United States").
[Vol. 261006
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Furthermore, for any police procedure, the laws are silent on
distinguishing between police conduct with an English speaking indi-
vidual and non-English speaking individual. Does this mean that
such laws that reference police procedure and do not specifically lay
out how to handle an English speaking defendant and a non-English
speaking defendant all violate equal protection rights?
Suppose, going forward, police provide a Spanish interpreter
to a defendant in a similar situation as the defendant in Garcia-
Cepero in order to support equal protection rights guaranteed under
the law. Due to the strong demand for Spanish speaking interpreters,
they are easily obtainable in the United States. 85 However, at what
monetary cost to the government do we draw the line at providing an
interpreter to the defendant? What happens when the person operat-
ing the vehicle only speaks an endangered or rare language such as
Ticuna 86 or Kuna?8 7 For obvious reasons, time is of the essence for
administering a breathalyzer test. The costs would be astronomical
for finding an interpreter immediately and for any language. Fur-
thermore, due to the obscurity of certain languages, obtaining an in-
terpreter may be nearly impossible. Does this mean the police should
provide an interpreter for Spanish speakers, but not Ticuna speakers,
due to financial restraints and impracticability? This most certainly
would be a violation of equal protection rights and be considered dis-
criminatory based on one's language.
The "threshold point of understanding"" established in
Niedzwiecki, seems to be an arbitrary and subjective standard. At
what point do law enforcement personnel know if the defendant does
not understand the question presented due to a language barrier or
due to his or her intoxication? Would an interpreter really be able to
make this distinction? As stated by the Appellate Division, Second
Department, in Carey v. Melton, VTL section 1194(2) is not con-
8 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosl75.htm (last visited Janu-
ary 17, 2010) (citing that the demand for translators of Portuguese, French, Italian, German,
Spanish, Arabic and other Middle Eastern languages, and the principal Asian languages is,
and will remain, strong).
86 See The Archive of the Indigenous Languages of Latin America, http://www.ailla. utex-
as.org/site/la langs.html (last visited January 17, 2010) (noting that Ticuna is a Latin Ameri-
can language spoken by approximately 21,000 people).
87 See id. (noting that Kuna is Latin American language spoken by approximately 50,000
people).
88 Niedzwiecki, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
2010] 1007
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strued as "requiring a 'knowing' refusal"89 by the defendant, as such
an "interpretation would lead to the absurd result that the greater the
degree of intoxication of an automobile driver, the less the degree of
his accountability."90 However, it seems nearly impossible for any
individual to determine a defendant's level of understanding when he
or she is potentially too inebriated to legally operate a vehicle, let
alone answer questions that will directly affect the defendant's future
freedom and driving privileges. The "mere presence of an interpre-
ter" 9' would not have, in fact, "obviated the discriminatory proce-
dure" 92 for this exact reason.
Based on the Reynolds decision, it was decided that Reynolds
obviously reached the appropriate level of understanding for which
he was receiving warnings. 93 However, other than repeatedly warn-
ing the defendant in English of the repercussions for refusing a brea-
thalyzer test, what additionally did the officer do to ensure the defen-
dant's requisite level of understanding? It seems reasonable that
stating any warnings to a defendant in his or her native language
would serve the equivalent purpose and raise the defendant to a com-
parable degree of comprehension. One could even argue that this
"threshold point of understanding" was not even a requirement of
VTL section 1194(2) in the eyes of the court in Reynolds.94 For ei-
ther interpretation, it is unreasonable to assert that equal protection
rights are violated if a translator is not provided to a non-English
speaking defendant. Since a recitation of translated warnings to a
non-English speaking defendant would be the equivalent action taken
in the case of an English speaking defendant, both types of defen-
dants are thus afforded the same rights.
Furthermore, it was also decided in Garcia-Cepero that the
discrimination between English and non-English speaking defendants
is further advanced because non-English speaking defendants are
"never" given other sobriety tests available other than breathalyzer
tests.9 5 Judge Cirigliano made this bold statement in his opinion
89 408 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978).
90 Id.
91 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
92 Id.
9 See Reynolds, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
94 See Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
9s Id. at 696.
1008 [Vol. 26
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without any support. Are we to believe that at no point has a non-
English speaking defendant ever been administered an HGN test?96
Issues of equal protection and due process often go hand-in-
hand.97 As such, the issue of procedural due process was also ad-
dressed in Garcia-Cepero.98 The Bronx County Supreme Court as-
sessed Garcia-Cepero's case, at length, according to the procedural
due process factors established in Mathews,99 and followed by New
York courts. 00 The court made it clear, and undoubtedly so, that the
facts in support of the first two factors of the test suggested a viola-
tion of the defendant's procedural due process rights.o'0 However,
most, if not all, actions or inactions by police officers could be con-
strued to potentially affect the guilt or innocence of a defendant. For
example, neglecting to read a defendant his or her Miranda rights,
neglecting to inform a driver of the probable cause for a traffic stop,
neglecting to inform a driver of the probable cause for administering
a field sobriety test, or neglecting to administer certain sobriety tests
completely, would all fall under the same category as Garcia-
Cepero's circumstance. Thus any action-either minor or signifi-
cant-by a police officer would fall under the first factor of the Su-
preme Court's procedural due process test, in a similar fashion of
guilt versus innocence, making the first prong itself almost irrelevant
in cases placing police procedure at issue.
The second prong of the federal test to evaluate procedural
due process issues can be classified similarly. Just as most, if not all,
actions or inactions by a police officer can affect a defendant's poten-
tial guilt or innocence, there is almost always a risk--either having an
effect on one's finances or one's freedom-in depriving a defendant
of such interest, and the degree of such risk is subjective and arbi-
trary. Granted, there is no question that Garcia-Cepero could have
96 A HGN test, also known as a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, "encompasses balance,
finger to nose, walking the line and other physical tests, to determine whether [the defendant
is] impaired or substantially impaired." Id.
97 See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 473, 474 (2002) (stating that "the relationship between
equality and liberty, and more specifically, between the equal protection and due process
clauses, is in fact bi-directional.").
9 See Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 696-98.
9 See supra text accompanying note 30.
1oo Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 696-98.
'0 Id. at 697.
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faced a higher fine or longer imprisonment time had he been con-
victed.102 However, how does the court assess some private interest
deprivation as causing too high a risk to be considered a violation of
procedural due process? Is it relative to the defendant's personal
wealth? A $1,000 fine may be a nominal amount of money to a de-
fendant who earns $200,000 per year, but a tremendous financial
burden to a defendant earning $25,000 per year. The violation of
one's procedural due process rights could then be classified as de-
pendant upon one's wealth. Isn't the purpose of due process to en-
sure that all are given fair notice and a fair opportunity to be heard?
Judge Cirigliano said it himself in the court's opinion that
"[o]bviously, the government has a paramount interest and obligation
in securing for all citizens the right to a fair trial."l 03
The third prong of the Supreme Court's evaluation of proce-
dural due process issues is probably one of the most important prongs
of the test, and naturally, the most divisive. As stated before, the
government has an interest in protecting its citizens' right to a fair tri-
al and "to insure that the ends of justice are served-that the guilty be
punished and the innocent be set free."' 04 The Bronx County Su-
preme Court claimed that in Garcia-Cepero's case, "both the prosecu-
tion and/or the defense may have been better served if an interpreter
would have been used."' 5 An explanation from an interpreter would
have purportedly clarified the choices presented to the defendant and
perhaps Garcia-Cepero would have made a different decision.106
However, we do not know this for sure. Explaining anything to any-
one who is too inebriated to legally operate a vehicle, and expecting a
coherent response, is difficult whether they speak English, Spanish,
French, Portuguese, or Ticuna.
It is indisputable that in Garcia-Cepero, the court provided
some valid points regarding the government's interest.107 However,
the court's reasoning with respect to the third prong of the federal test
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the most important public policies to be addressed.109 As previously
discussed, the costs of obtaining an interpreter for all non-English
speaking defendants, faced with the decision of whether or not to take
a breathalyzer test could be astronomical and impracticable. Time is
of the essence for administering a breathalyzer test."o Obtaining an
interpreter in a short time span and for any language'" could be cost-
ly and infeasible.
This ought to have been greatly considered in Garcia-Cepero.
Rather, the court reasoned that "employing interpreters to aid in
communication in these type of cases does not seem like an insur-
mountable burden when balanced against the defendant's rights to a
fair trial."" 2 Perhaps obtaining a Spanish interpreter would have
been a smaller cost in comparison to the defendant's right to a fair
trial in that case, being that there is a large supply, due to the high
demand," 3 of Spanish interpreters in the United States. However,
because of the court's brief and incomplete consideration of the fi-
nancial feasibility of obtaining an interpreter in Garcia-Cepero, judi-
cial precedent was established that could wind up costing the gov-
ernment millions of dollars, or put police officers in a position that is
impossible to fulfill.
Furthermore, the third prong of the test is difficult to accept as
completely reasonable. How can a court quantify the value of a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial? How can the court quantify the gov-
ernment's interests, which is supposed to represent the people's inter-
ests? Outside of fiscal considerations, this seems like an
unreasonable analysis.
In Torres, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that
"[i]t is a well established precept of due process that non-English
speaking defendants in criminal actions are entitled to an interpre-
109 See id.
110 The rate at which alcohol oxidizes in the body depends on factors such as one's height,
weight, gender, and food consumed. Generally, after the consumption of one alcoholic be-
verage (12 ounces of beer, 6 ounces of wine, or 1.5 ounces of 80-proof liquor), the blood
alcohol content of a person peaks within 30 to 45 minutes. See Intoximeters Incorporated,
http://www.intox.com/aboutalcohol.asp (last visited April 22, 2010).
11 As previously discussed, a police officer could be faced with a situation in which the
defendant only speaks an obscure or endangered language. Finding an interpreter imme-
diately, for certain languages, may be impossible.
112 Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (emphasis added).
113 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 85.
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ter."ll 4 In Torres, however, the issue of the necessity of an interpre-
ter was in reference to the defendant's guilty plea.s15 From a strictly
financial point of view, the potential cost of obtaining an interpreter
in Torres would not have been great since time was not an issue, as it
was in Garcia-Cepero. Furthermore, in Torres it was decided that
the defendant's due process rights were not violated since the ramifi-
cations of pleading guilty were fully explained and demonstrated as
understood by the defendant.1 16 Once again, this level of understand-
ing would be nearly impossible to demonstrate if an interpreter is
provided to an intoxicated defendant.
In Yellen, the Richmond County Civil Court stated that "[i]t is
a fundamental axiom of our system of jurisprudence that due process
of law includes the right to have an adequate interpretation of the
proceedings. This would apply to a litigant who does not speak suf-
ficient English.""'7 In that case, it was deemed that an interpreter was
necessary to proceed, otherwise it would be a violation of the defen-
dant's due process rights."' 8 However, again, from a strictly financial
point of view, obtaining an interpreter in a timely manner was not an
issue in Yellen.
Had the court in Garcia-Cepero delved further into New York
case law addressing similar non-English speaking defendant issues, it
would have been apparent that Garcia-Cepero's due process rights
were not violated. In both Torres and Yellen, the courts state that a
non-English speaking defendant is generally entitled to an interpreter
in criminal proceedings; however, both cases address providing an
interpreter at a different stage of the criminal justice process. Provid-
ing an interpreter earlier in the criminal justice process may avoid
later issues, but practicality and monetary issues ought to be consi-
dered.
New York is unclear in its case law as to what stage in the
criminal justice process it is absolutely necessary to provide a non-
English speaking defendant an interpreter in order to uphold one's
fundamental constitutional right to due process. Also, the New York
114 Torres, 772 N.Y.S.2d at 126 (quoting Rodriguez, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1995), Iv denied 87 N.Y.2d 924 (1996)).
" Id.
116 Id.
"' Yellen, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
118 Id. at 726.
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courts have yet to seriously consider public policy reasons, such as
fiscal responsibility. On the other hand, a large portion of the Su-
preme Court's standard seems to be irrelevant and meaningless, while
the remaining portion is unreasonably subjective.
In the case of Garcia-Cepero, although the court's reasoning
is flawed in its incomplete analysis, at a minimum, the standard ad-
dresses crucial issues with respect to due process and public policy
considerations. Perhaps in pursuit of sound reasoning and practical
considerations, New York courts should be less dismissive of the
public policy issues surrounding procedural due process claims in the
context of VTL section 1194. After all, it would be foolish of the jus-
tice system to promise something that in certain cases it cannot deliv-
er.
Although VTL section 1194 does not differentiate between
English speaking defendants and non-English speaking defendants,' 1 9
the reasoning in Garcia-Cepero that the defendant's equal protection
rights were violated when he was not provided with a Spanish inter-
preterl20 is unsound. By providing an interpreter to a non-English
speaking defendant, the judicial process then affords such defendants
with additional considerations that are not given to English speaking
defendants. Furthermore, setting such a precedent creates a slippery
slope with respect to determining for what languages will defendants
be provided an interpreter and at what cost or impracticability does
the government draw the line.
Madeline Zuckerman
"' See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney 2006).
120 See Garcia-Cepero, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 695-96.
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